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     1. Introduction
A commonly used risk measure re￿ ecting a bank￿ s probability of insolvency is the Z-score;
it is most often attributed to Boyd and Graham (1986), Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and
Boyd et al. (1993), although its roots can be traced back as far as Roy (1952). Its use in
banking and ￿nancial stability related studies is widespread due to its relative simplicity and
the fact that it can be calculated relying solely on accounting information.
Such Z-score measures are now also being applied at aggregate, i.e. sectoral, regional or
country, rather than individual bank levels, using various approaches. Uhde and Heimesho⁄
(2009) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2010) aggregate individual bank balance sheets
before calculating aggregate Z-scores, while Beck et al. (2010) use the median of individually
calculated Z-scores instead; Houston et al. (2010), on the other hand, use the (weighted)
mean of individually calculated Z-score measures as their aggregate insolvency risk measure.
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that aggregate bank insolvency risk measures
that are constructed using the (weighted) mean of individually calculated Z-score measures
are inherently biased; we also propose an alternative approach to their construction that
avoids this problem.
2. Aggregate Z-score measures: a caveat
Let us ￿rst recapitulate the probabilistic rationale for the use of Z-score measures in the
following
Lemma. De￿ne bank insolvency as a state where (car + roa) ￿ 0, with car the bank￿ s
capital-asset ratio and roa its return on assets. Then, if roa is a normally distributed random
variable such that roa ￿ N(￿roa;￿2
roa), Boyd and Graham (1986) noted that the probability
of insolvency can be given as
p(roa ￿ ￿car) = p(
roa ￿ ￿roa
￿roa
￿ ￿Z) = ￿(￿Z) (1)
where the Z-score is de￿ned as Z ￿
car+￿roa
￿roa > 0, and ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution N(0;1).
We can then directly state the subsequent




i=1 wi = 1) gives a down-
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i=1 wi￿(￿Zi) > ￿(￿
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i=1 wiZi) from Equation (1).
Proof. Noting that ￿00(￿Z) = (2￿)
￿ 1
2 e￿ Z2
2 Z > 0 for Z > 0, this is a direct consequence of
Jensen￿ s inequality (see Feller, 1971, p. 153), which states that if u(x) is a strictly convex
function, then E [u(X)] > u(E [X]) provided that the expectations exist.
Clearly, Corollary 1 represents an important caveat for the construction of aggregate bank
insolvency risk measures in stressing the inherent bias introduced if they are calculated using
a (weighted) average of Z-score measures. However, it also points towards a straightforward
solution to this potential bias problem, which we state in
2Corollary 2. When constructing (weighted) mean-based aggregate insolvency risk measures,
these should be computed as (weighted) averages of the probabilities of insolvency, as implied





Proof. This follows from Corollary 1.
Aggregate bank insolvency risk measures constructed in this manner can then be appro-
priately transformed for use in regression analysis, e.g. using a probit1 and/or logarithmic
transformation; (implicitly) applying such nonlinear transformations before aggregation leads
to a biased measure of aggregate insolvency risk because of Jensen￿ s inequality.
3. Conclusion
We showed that a popular approach to constructing (weighted) mean-based aggregate
bank insolvency risk measures is inherently biased because of Jensen￿ s inequality; we also
proposed a straightforward alternative approach that avoids this problem.
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